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DAILY SEASONALITIFS AND STOCK MARKEr REFORMS IN SPAIN 
Abstract: 
This paper addresses the consequences of Spanish Stock Exchange Reform on the seasonal 
patterns of daily asset returns. Before the Reform, positive abnormal average Monday excess 
returns are found. Possible causes are discussed and related with clearing and trading 
mechanisms. After the Reform daily seasonal effects disappear, suggesting an increase in the 
market's operational efficiency. 
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DAILY SEASONALITIFS AND STOCK MARKET REFORMS IN SPAIN 
I.INTRODUCTION 
Research in weekend effects an other financial markets anomalies has blossomed in recent 
years, as can be seen in Guimaraes et al. (1989). Evidence of international "weekend effects" 
are provided in Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) and its relationships with country-specific 
settlement procedures are discussed for instance in Solnik (1990). 
For the Spain stock market, the pioneering work of Santesmases (1986) found no evidence 
of daily seasonalities, but his sample was from 1979 to 1983, where the trading period took 
place only from Tuesday to Friday. Rubio (1991) using data between 1984 and 1988 reports 
a positive and significant average Monday return; Martinez Abascal (1993) using data from 
1985 to 1989 also found the positive Monday effect. Those results are in contrast with the 
usual weekend effect, where the average return on Friday is abnormally high and the average 
return on Monday is abnormally low. This paper aims to extend previous research using a 
larger sample 1986-1993, and more comprehensive database. In particular we use the 
Market's general Index and also 60 stocks grouped in seven sector-specific portfolios. We 
offer one possible explanation for this "exotic" Monday effect based on the clearing and 
trading procedures of the spanish market. Another contribution of this paper is to take into 
account the effect of institutional changes in the market after the spanish "Big Bang" , the new 
Spanish Securities Market Act of 28th July, 1988 which began to operate on 29th July, 1989. 
The paper is organized as follows. Market structure is discussed first. Then we present data, 
methodology and results. We treat clearing and trading procedures and present concluding 
remarks in the final section 
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2.MARKEf STRUCfURE 
There are four stock exchanges in Spain; Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Bilbao. Madrid 
is the dominant exchange, accounting for almost 90 % of trading activity. At the end of 1992 
the total market value of equities quoted on the Madrid Stock Exchange was about 1 % of 
World's capitalization. The largest individual sector was Banking (24 % of the total), followed 
by Electrical Utilities (21 %), Telecommunications (11 %), Oil and Chemicals (10%), 
Construction (8 %), Investments (6%) and Metal Industrial (5 %). Foreign investors are free 
to invest in the Spanish securities markets. The Spanish Securities Market Act (SSMA) took 
effect in July 1989 and its main points were: 
a) Official Stock Market Agents, previously appointed by the Government, were replaced by 
private Brokers and Dealers. 
b) The introduction of the Computer Assisted Trading System (CATS) open from 11 :OOam 
to 5 :OOpm and the termination of the traditional open outcry trading process. That system 
become fully operational in the first quarter 1990. However some floor trading remain for 
small stocks from 10:00am to 12: 15pm. 
c) The previously regulated Brokerage Fees were liberalized, and the resulting commission 




d) The setting up of the National Stock Exchange Commission (CNMV), Spain's version of 
the US's SEC. 
e) A new settlement and clearing service was created (NSL) and was operational at the same 
time that CATS; cash balances are cleared in 48 hours. Before SSMA, cash balances of 
operations from one given week (Monday to Friday) were cleared on next week's Friday. 
The settlement period is T+I0, and before SSMA was T+30. In April 1993 the CNMV 
opened its new Servicio de Compensacion y Liquidacion (SCVL), the securities settlement 
and clearing service aimed at expediting the settlement period. The new system initially 
red uces the settlement period in Spain from T + 10 and in some cases T + 15 to T + 7; later 
in 1993 the exchange believes this period will be reduced further to T + 5. 
Madrid Stock Exchange's general Index (IGBM) is made up each year of 70-90 companies 
and represents about 80-85% of the total capitalization of the market, excluding foreign 
stocks. It accounts for dividends and stock splits, and is a market value weighted index. 
Therefore it should reflect mainly the behavior of the big firms. 
3.DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The data used in the analysis include the daily returns of IGBM, and the daily returns of a 
sample of 60 stocks grouped in 7 sectorial value-weighted portfolios: Banks (BAN), Electric 
Utilities (ELE) , Communications (COM), Chemical&Oil (CRE) , Construction (BUI) , 
Investments (INV) and Metal Industrial (MET) , which represent some of the most actively 
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traded stocks on the market and have been listed without interruptions in almost all cases 
from January 2,1986 to March 31,1993 so we have 1885 sample data points. The value 
traded on these 60 stocks accounts for almost 80 percent of the total value of stocks traded 
on the Madrid Stock Market during this periodl . 
For each day, we compute the return as the percentage change in the value of the index 
(portfolio) from the previous day, taking into account dividends and stock splits. Then we 
subtract the risk free interest rate, to compute excess returns. On Mondays we also subtract 
the two day rate to take into account the weekend devoid of interest. We analyze the total 
sample and two subsets to take into account the introduction of CATS. As the new system 
started at the end of 1989 and became operationally representative along the first quarter of 
1990, we select the last day of these period, March 31, 1990 as the effective date of CATS 
implantation. We do not use the data from December 1989 to March 1990 to avoid problems 
with the transition period. 
Following French (1980), Gibbons and Hess (1981) and Keim and Stambaugh (1984), we 
construct a test for differences in the mean return across the days of the week by computing 
the following regression for IGBM and the sectorial portfolios: 
where i=l, 2, 3 and t(1)=I, ... , 1885; t(2)=I, ... , 1000; t(3)=1101, ... ,1885 and 
where d lt = 1 if day t is a Monday, and d1t=0 otherwise; d2t = 1 if t is a Tuesday, etc. 
1 Details on the data (firms, sectors, etc.) are available on request. 
(1) 
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Some preliminary data analysis pointed out nonconstant variance and one-Iag autocorrelation 
in the data. Therefore, to improve consistency and efficiency, we estimate model (1) allowing 
for first order autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity i.e. 
eC(il = ~lIC-l(i) + aC(il 
at(il - (0, 0:<(.1)) 
(2) 
For consistent inference based on estimated parameters in (1) and (2) we use White (1980) 
estimator of the parameters' covariance matrix. 
The regressions were also run in an amended form with four dummy variables plus an 
intercept term. Arbitrarily a dummy variable for Mondays is excluded. The coefficients of 
this model are the means for each day of the week deviated from Monday. The F statistics 
from these regressions enable us to test if the observed excess return on Monday is different 
from the rest of the week. We perform the test for total sample, before and after CATS. 
3.1 RESULTS 
Results are reported in Tables 1 to 3. Some explanations are in order. The estimated 
parameters are above and t-statistics below. F-statistic is given and below its p-value. As a 
general test for residual autocorrelation we report the portmanteau statistic QLB by Ljung-Box 
with 5 degrees of freedom, and its associated p-value. Also, we include ~ McLeod-Li 
statistic as a general test for heteroscedasticity/nonlinearity and its p-value. Overall results 
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signal a significant positive average Monday return almost in all cases, for the total sample, 
and even more clearly before CATS. However that effect disappears after CATS. 
Highly significant ~l parameters can be related to non-synchronous trading problems and 
associated factors addressed elsewhere (see Peiia (1993) for evidence on these issues) and the 
results do not necessarily indicate weak form inefficiency. Before CATS, Monday effects are 
clearer. Also autocorrelation seems to be more evident, specially in the case of Banks. One 
reason for this could be that, before CATS, Banks were not traded in the usual open outcry 
method, but instead followed a written order entry system ("par cassiers"). The method is 
that trading orders are accumulated in an order "book" and using a computer program one 
clearing price is provided. Spanish banks used to "care" about their own price quotations 
and usually some kind of "intervention" was not uncommon. Other specific features of the 
Banking sector in the stock market are described in Berges and Soria (1992). 
In Table 4 we present F-statistics to test whether the observed excess returns on Mondays 
is different from the rest of the week. Overall, previous results are confirmed. Before CATS 
we can reject the equality hypothesis at reasonable significance levels. After CATS however, 
that hypotheses is not rejected. 
The consequences of the above results for the weak form of the Efficient Market hypotheses 
could be addressed designing trading systems to take into account those regularities and, 
adjusting for market risk and brokerage fees, compare its profits against a conservative buy-
and-hold policy. For instance we could buy a selected portfolio on Tuesdays or Wednesdays 
and sell on Mondays. Some simple simulation exercises were done (available on request) and 
r 
7 
the results agree with other experiments reported in Martinez Abascal (1993). The transaction 
costs are high and only slim economically significant (before taxes) profit can be obtained. 
After CATS no weekday effects are apparent and the autocorrelations are lower suggesting 
improvements in the operational efficiency of this market. 
3.2 A COMMENT ON TRADING AND CLEARING EFFECfS 
It can be argued that before CATS, trading and clearing effects are the responsible for 
Monday effects. In fact, it was customary for the Official Market Agents to accumulate 
orders coming from outside Madrid in one given week and execute them at the beginning 
(Monday) of the next week. This could cause some price pressures at the beginning of the 
week. 
Another explanation could be related with clearing mechanisms as follows. Before CATS any 
transaction (buy/sell) in one given week (from Monday to Friday) was cleared in cash on the 
following week's Friday. That gives the investor the possibility of buying stocks without 
using any cash, provided that offsetting orders are placed before the end of the week. 
Therefore an extra volume of buy orders should be expected on Monday to profit from five-




The existence of one special form of the weekend effect is documented in the Spain stock 
market. Before CATS, average Monday excess returns were abnormally high. Also 
significant autocorrelations are found suggesting one nontrivial amount of trading frictions 
in this market, specially in the Banks sector. However is not clear that trading systems based 
on these empirical regularities could "beat the market". 
Overall, results suggest that introduction of the new system of clearing and trading (after 
CA TS) has improved the operational efficiency in this market, lowering frictions as signaled 
by lower autocorrelations and that Monday effects disappear. 
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TABLE 1 crotal Sample. White Covariance Matrix) 
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri R2 F(P) QLB(5) ~l 
1GB .0013 -.0009 -.0003 .0004 .0009 .075 30.6 4.91 .263 
2.3* -1.07 -1.17 .38 1.68 .000 .43 5.2** 
BAN .0008 -.0001 -.0007 .0003 .0012 .138 60.5 1.46 .365 
1.3 -.31 -1.6 .58 2.1* .000 .92 7.7** 
COM .0004 -.0006 -.0002 .0012 .0010 .005 1.86 2.2 .057 
.4 -.7 -.2 1.4 1.0 .09 .85 .097 
ELE .0016 -.0011 -.0005 .0000 .0009 .023 9.17 2.8 .134 
2.6** -1.3 -.6 .00 1.04 .000 .83 2.6** 
MET .0036 -.0019 -.0011 .0005 -.0011 .451 140.1 1.2 .179 
3.7** -2.1 * -1.35 .60 -1.4 .000 .92 3.5** 
CRE .0034 -.0021 .0004 -.0000 -.0003 .179 34.17 1.48 .184 
3.6** -1.9 .53 -.07 -.42 .000 .91 4.9** 
BUI .0028 -.0016 -.0006 .0008 .0007 .253 48.9 1.6 .305 
2.6** -1.8 -.8 1.1 1.0 .00 .82 8.9** 
INV .0007 -.0006 -.0001 .0002 .0010 .152 25.6 4.3 .311 
1.1 -.8 -.2 .3 1.5 0.00 .51 7.2** 
** 1 % SI niflcant g * 5 % SI nifIcant g 
r 
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TABLE 2 <Before CATS. White Covariance Matrix) 
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri R2 F(P) QLB(5) 4', 
1GB .0033 -.0014 . ()()()() .0006 .0008 .152 39.26 19.1 .367 
4.3** -1.9 .00 .83 1.06 .000 .11 5.3** 
BAN .0019 -.0007 -.0003 .0002 .0018 .339 112.4 4.1 .574 
3.3** -1.0 -.6 .48 3.1** .000 .51 11 ** 
COM .0012 -.0022 -.0002 .0012 .0013 .008 1.96 4.3 .065 
.8 -1.5 -.2 1.0 .88 .08 .51 .087 
ELE .0049 -.0011 -.0004 -.0002 .0006 .040 9.12 7.5 .155 
3.6** -1.3 -.4 -.23 .4 .000 .32 2.5** 
MET .0087 -.0013 -.0022 .0016 -.0010 .504 111.1 10.2 .171 
5.8** -1.3 -1.75 1.3 -.84 .000 .22 3.3** 
CHE .0068 -.0015 .0010 .0002 -.0008 .210 32.4 5.2 .264 
5.3** -1.5 .93 .27 -.78 .000 .47 6.3** 
BUI .0057 -.0023 -.0001 .0015 .0007 .319 51.4 4.8 .361 
5.5** -2.01 * -.16 1.9 .70 .000 .32 7.7** 
INV .0017 -.0012 -.0008 .0013 .0011 .154 28.6 4.5 .212 
2.2* -1.6 -.2 1.9 1.4 0.00 .71 6.1** 
** 1 % SI niflcant g * j % SI nitlcant g 
r 
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TABLE 3 (After CATS. White Covariance Matrix) 
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri R2 F(P) QLB(5) ~1 
1GB -.0009 .0010 -.0011 -.0004 .0009 .020 3.3 1.46 .124 
-.8 1.1 -1.6 -.47 1.08 .006 .93 1.9 
BAN -.0011 .0008 -.0013 .0002 .0012 .034 5.57 2.3 .169 
-.9 .92 -1.56 .23 1.3 .000 .85 2.6** 
COM -.0007 .0015 -.0001 .0012 .0006 .005 0.86 1.1 .034 
-.6 1.7 -.12 1.2 .5 .54 .94 .65 
ELE -.0006 .0014 -.0004 .0005 .0013 .011 1.89 2.2 .087 
-.5 1.6 -.6 .58 1.48 .093 .85 1.2 
MET .0019 -.0012 -.0018 -.0017 -.0013 .082 13.9 1.5 .157 
1.8 -1.1 -1.6 -1.6 -1.2 .000 .92 2.5** 
CHE .0006 .0003 -.0000 -.0005 .0003 .001 0.03 2.1 .028 
.6 .24 -.06 -.57 .32 .99 .87 .43 
BDI .0005 -.0010 -.0015 .0020 -.0000 .051 8.35 2.8 .218 
.4 -.8 -1.2 -1.6 -.02 .000 .83 4.2** 
INV -.0014 -.0012 -.0015 -.0025 .0011. .085 15.6 1.6 .087 
-1.1 -.9 -1.2 -2.0* 95 0.00 .89 2.3* 
** 1 % SI niflcant g * 5 % SI niflcant g 
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TABLE 4 F-Statistics for differences in means 
TOTAL SAMPLE BEFORE CATS AFTER CATS 
F-STAT P-VAL F-STAT P-VAL F-STAT P-VAL 
1GB 3.0 0.017 5.7 0.000 0.85 0.543 
BAN 1.9 0.113 4.5 0.000 1.81 0.151 
COM 1.7 0.183 1.8 0.152 0.07 0.951 
ELE 3.1 0.011 4.6 0.000 1.0 0.387 
MET 6.4 0.000 7.2 0.000 1.2 0.316 
CHE 5.2 0.000 6.9 0.000 2.1 0.076 
BUI 3.2 0.011 6.8 0.000 0.67 0.533 
INV 1.1 0.214 4.3 0.000 1.4 0.324 
